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Abstract—In the simplest variant of the model of collective decision making in the stochastic en-
vironment, the participants were segregated into egoists and a group of collectivists. “Proposal
of the environment” is the stochastically generated vector of algebraic increments of capitals.
The social dynamics was defined by the sequence of proposals accepted by threshold-majority
voting. Analytical expressions of the expected values of the capitals of participants, collectivists
and egoists were obtained. Distinctions of some principles of group voting were discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A model where the participants vote for the projects of redistribution of their own property was
analyzed by A.V. Malishevskii in the late 1960’s [1, pp. 93–95]. In this model, voting is greatly
manipulatable by the organizers, as it is the case with the participants whose “ideals” are the points
in the multidimensional space of programs [2] (see also [3]). The monograph [4] is devoted to the
spatial voting models. The problems of relations between selfishness, altruism, and rationality
were considered in [5–7], and voting as a method of making decisions about redistribution of social
benefits by means of taxation and social programs was discussed in [8–11].
For a stochastic environment oriented to the analysis of “effectiveness” of the voters’ collectivist
and selfish attitudes in the conditions where new programs are randomly generated by the “en-
vironment,” rather than developed by the organizers or participants of voting, a model of voting
was suggested by the present author and analyzed in [12]. Consideration was given to the case of
neutral environment, the rest of the cases being analyzed mostly in qualitative terms. Emphasis
was made on the time dependencies of the participant “capitals” under various values of the model
parameters. In what follows, the present author obtained explicit expressions of these dependencies,
the exact formulas of expectations and their normal approximations. These formulas enable one to
determine the nature of social dynamics under any values of the model parameters. Expressions
for the expectations of the capital increments were obtained in Sec. 3, the necessary lemmas being
proved in Sec. 2.
We give a thumbnail of the simplest variant of the model. The “society” is assumed to con-
sist of n “participants” of which ℓ are “egoists” and g = n − ℓ are the “group” members. At
any time instant, the participant is characterized by its “capital” expressed by a real number and
interpreted in the most general sense (like utility). Each participant has some starting capital.
The “environment proposal” is the vector (d1, . . . , dn) of the algebraic increments of the capitals
of all participants. These increments are independent-in-aggregate random variables with identical
distribution N(µ, σ2), where µ and σ are the model parameters. At each step, one random “envi-
ronment proposal” is put to the vote. Each “egoist” votes “for” if and only if the proposal brings it
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a positive capital increment. Each member of the group votes “for” if and only if the group gains
from the realization of this proposal. The “gain” may be understood differently. The basic model
considers two fundamental principles of decision voting .
Principle A. The group votes “for” the proposal (d1, . . . , dn) if and only if as the result of its
approval the number of group members getting a positive capital increment exceeds that of the group
members getting a negative increment.
Principle B. The group votes “for” the proposal (d1, . . . , dn) if and only if the sum of increments
of group members is positive:
∑
di > 0, where the sum is taken over the subscripts of the group
participants.
The results of voting are summarized using the “α-majority” procedure: the proposal is accepted
if and only if more than αn, 0 ≤ α < 1, participants vote for it. If the proposal is accepted, then
the capitals of all participants get the corresponding increments d1, . . . , dn, or remain the same,
otherwise.
Capital dynamics of the participants is analyzed in terms of their social roles (“egoist” or “group
member”) and model parameters. It is implied, in particular, that a scenario is plausible where the
egoists join the group and the “group egoism” resembles more and more the decision making in the
interests of the entire society. By another hypothetical scenario, an “ineffective” group dissolves,
and its members either become “egoists” or make other groups. It is planned also to consider
the case of a socially oriented group supporting its poorest members and preventing their ruin, a
variant of the model where the capital increments depend on their current values, the impact on
the social dynamics of the mechanisms of taxation and collection of the “party dues,” and so on. At
the same time, it is not planned to consider purely economical mechanisms of capital reproduction
and loss because our aim lies in analyzing the social, rather than the economic phenomena.
Consideration is given not only to the traditional decision threshold α = 0.5 corresponding to the
“simple majority,” but to all thresholds ranging from 0 to 1. That is due to the fact that the most
important—for example, “constitutional”—decisions are accepted by the a “qualified parliamentary
majority” with a threshold greater than 0.5. On the other hand, there are “initiative” decisions
such as forming new deputy groups in parliament, putting question on agenda, sending requests
to other state authorities, initiating referendums, and so on which can be approved by a certain
number of votes smaller than one half. This model is discussed in more detail in [12].
The relation between the numbers of egoists and group members is defined by the parameter
β = ℓ/2n, half of the portion of egoists among all participants. We denote by fµ,σ(·) and Fµ,σ(·),
respectively, the one-dimensional density and the cumulative distribution function corresponding
to the distribution N(µ, σ2); f(·) and F (·) stand for density and the distribution function of the
normal distribution with center at 0 and variance 1;M(ξ) and σ(ξ) are, respectively, the expectation
and the deviation of any of the random variable ξ at hand.
Each ith egoist participant votes for a proposal if and only if di > 0. The probability of this
event is as follows:
p = P{di > 0} = 1− Fµ,σ(0) = F
(
µ
σ
)
; (1)
the probability of voting “against” the proposal is as follows:
q = 1− p = P{di < 0} = Fµ,σ(0) = 1− F
(
µ
σ
)
= F
(
−µ
σ
)
. (2)
In what follows, we also need the notation
f = f
(
µ
σ
)
. (3)
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According to the model, the probability that a participant abstains from voting is zero because
the normal distribution is continuous. Therefore, the voting of an egoist participant is the Bernoulli
test with the parameter p. Then, since the values di are independent, the number of egoists voting
“for” is distributed binomially with the parameters ℓ and p. The mean value and the variance of
this distribution are, respectively, pℓ and pqℓ.
2. LEMMAS OF THE “NORMAL VOTING SAMPLE”
In this section we prove lemmas that underlie the following calculations. By the “normal voting
sample” of size1 ℓ with the parameters (µ, σ2) and voting threshold ℓ0 is meant the totality of
random variables
(
ζ1I(ζ, ℓ0), . . . , ζℓI(ζ, ℓ0)
)
, where ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζℓ) is a sample from the distribution
N(µ, σ2),
I(ζ, ℓ0) =
{
1 if n+(ζ) > ℓ0;
0, otherwise,
(4)
and2
n+(ζ) = #{k : ζk > 0, k = 1, . . . , ℓ}. (5)
The following lemma holds.
Lemma 1. Let (η1, . . . , ηℓ) be a normal voting sample with the parameters (µ, σ
2) and the voting
threshold ℓ0. Then,
3 for any k = 1, . . . , ℓ
M(ηk) =
ℓ∑
x=[ℓ0]+1
(
µ+
σf
q
(
x
pℓ
− 1
))(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x, (6)
where p, q, and f are defined in (1)–(3).
The proofs are given in the Appendix.
To calculate (6), one may use the well-known relation between the binomial distribution and
the beta-distribution:
ℓ∑
x=t
(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x = B(p | t, ℓ− t+ 1), (7)
the right-hand side contains the cumulative function of the distribution of beta-distribution with t
and ℓ− t+ 1 degrees of freedom. However, the normal approximation of the binomial probability
can be used even for a comparatively small ℓ:(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x ≈ f
(
x− µ′
σ′
)
≈ F
(
x+ 0.5− µ′
σ′
)
− F
(
x− 0.5− µ′
σ′
)
, (8)
where µ′ and σ′ are the same parameters as for the binomial distribution: µ′ = pℓ, σ′ =
√
pqℓ.
Summation in (8) provides an approximation to the binomial distribution function:
t∑
x=0
(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x ≈ F
(
t+ 0.5 − pℓ√
pqℓ
)
and
ℓ∑
x=t+1
(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x ≈ F
(
− t+ 0.5 − pℓ√
pqℓ
)
.
(9)
1 In this section, ℓ is an arbitrary integer.
2 #X denotes the number of elements in the finite set X.
3 Here and below the sum is zero if the lower limit is greater than the upper one. The integer part is bracketed.
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The normal approximation is advisable for pqℓ ≥ 9. For a fixed pqℓ, its accuracy is maximal
for p = 0.5 and decreases with p approaching 0 or 1. Therefore, the normal approximation is often
recommendable for 0.1 < p < 0.9 already if pqℓ > 5. For the values of p that are very close to 0 or
1, usually the condition pqℓ > 25 is imposed.
Lemma 2. Let (η1, . . . , ηℓ) be a normal voting sample with the parameters (µ, σ
2) and the voting
threshold ℓ0. Then substitution of the standard normal approximation of the random variable n
+(ζ)
for its binomial distribution provides the following approximation of M(ηk) for any k = 1, . . . , ℓ :
M(ηk) ≈ µF (−ℓ′0) +
σf√
pqℓ
f(ℓ′0), (10)
where ℓ′0 = ([ℓ0] + 0.5− pℓ)/
√
pqℓ.
This approximation is equivalent to the replacement of a finite number of the participants of
voting by a continuous “voting field.” We present for completeness sake the following lemma where
J(ζ, ℓ0) differs from I(ζ, ℓ0) (4) in the sign of inequality in the definition. Its proof is similar to
that of Lemmas 1 and 2.
Lemma 3. Let (η1, . . . , ηℓ) = (ζ1J(ζ, ℓ0), . . . , ζℓJ(ζ, ℓ0)), where ζ = (ζ1, . . . , ζℓ), be a sample from
the distribution N(µ, σ2) and
J(ζ, ℓ0) =
{
1 if n+(ζ) ≤ ℓ0;
0, otherwise.
(11)
Then, for any k = 1, . . . , ℓ
M(ηk) =
[ℓ0]∑
x=0
(
µ+
σf
q
(
x
pℓ
− 1
))(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x, (12)
and the normal approximation provides the approximation
M(ηk) ≈ µF (ℓ′0)−
σf√
pqℓ
f(ℓ′0), (13)
where ℓ′0 = ([ℓ0] + 0.5− pℓ)/
√
pqℓ.
To sum up the auxiliary results, we denote by µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, ℓ0) the expectation of the normal voting
sample of size ℓ with the parameters (µ, σ2) and the voting threshold ℓ0, and by µ
−(µ, σ, ℓ, ℓ0), the
expectation of the set of random variables as defined in Lemma 3. Then, the exact and approximate
values of µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, ℓ0) obey the formulas (6) and (10), and the exact and approximate values of
µ−(µ, σ, ℓ, ℓ0) obey the formulas (12) and (13).
3. GENERAL EXPRESSIONS FOR THE MEAN INCREMENTS OF CAPITALS
3.1. Increment of the Egoist’s Capital
Let us calculate the expectation M(d˜E ) of the egoist’s capital increment in one step.4 We recall
that a step lies is considering one proposal of the environment by the participants, independently of
4 The notation under tilde refers to the actual, in contrast to the proposed, capital increments.
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whether it is accepted or not. Let the event G be supported by the group, and G be the opposite.
Then,
M(d˜E ) =M(d˜E | G)P{G} +M(d˜E | G)P{G}. (14)
We denote P{G} and P{G} = 1− P{G}, respectively, by PG and QG.
Support of a proposal by the group brings it (1 − 2β)n votes. Consequently, for approval of a
proposal on condition that it is supported by the group, it is necessary and sufficient that more
than (α − (1 − 2β))n egoists vote for it. If the group does not support the proposal, then it is
necessary and sufficient that more than αn egoists vote for it. Therefore,
M(d˜E | G) = µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn), M(d˜E | G) = µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn), (15)
where γ = α− (1− 2β) and [t] is the integer part of t. Hence,
M(d˜E ) = µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, γn)PG + µ+(µ, σ, ℓ, αn)QG. (16)
By substituting expression (6) for µ+(·, ·, ·, ·) in (16) and using the notation
b(x | ℓ) =
(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x, (17)
we obtain
M(d˜E ) = PG
ℓ∑
x=[γn]+1
(
µ+
σf
q
(
x
pℓ
− 1
))
b(x | ℓ) (18)
+ QG
ℓ∑
x=[αn]+1
(
µ+
σf
q
(
x
pℓ
− 1
))
b(x | ℓ)
= PG
[αn]∑
x=[γn]+1
(
µ+
σf
q
(
x
pℓ
− 1
))
b(x | ℓ)
+
ℓ∑
x=[αn]+1
(
µ+
σf
q
(
x
pℓ
− 1
))
b(x | ℓ).
If the group follows Principle A, then
PAG =
g∑
x=[g/2]+1
b(x | g) and QAG = 1− PAG =
[g/2]∑
x=0
b(x | g) (19)
should be substituted for PG and QG, respectively, and in the case of Principle B,
PBG = F
(
µ
√
g
σ
)
and QBG = 1− PBG = F
(
−µ
√
g
σ
)
, (20)
because for an arbitrary proposal the mean capital increment of the group has the distribution
N
(
µ,
σ√
g
)
.
Now, by substituting in (16) the normal approximation (10) for µ+(·, ·, ·, ·) and using the notation
Fθ = F
(
− [θn] + 0.5− pℓ√
pqℓ
)
, fθ = f
(
[θn] + 0.5− pℓ√
pqℓ
)
, (21)
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we get
M(d˜E ) ≈ PG
(
µFγ +
σf√
pqℓ
fγ
)
+QG
(
µFα +
σf√
pqℓ
fα
)
(22)
= [PG QG]
(
µ
[
Fγ
Fα
]
+
σf√
pqℓ
[
fγ
fα
])
where matrix notation is used. In the case of Principle A, the approximate values
F
(
−
[ g
2
]
+ 0.5 − pg√
pqg
)
≈ PAG ,
1− F
(
−
[g
2
]
+ 0.5− pg√
pqg
)
= F
([ g
2
]
+ 0.5− pg√
pqg
)
≈ QAG
(23)
or exact values (19) must be substituted in this formula; in the case of Principle B, the exact values
of (20).
3.2. Increment of the Capital of Group Member
Now we derive formulas similar to (18) and (22) for the expectation M(d˜G) of the capital
increment of a group member in one step. Let Eθ be an event of egoists giving more than θn votes
to the proposal; Eθ, otherwise. If Eα is satisfied, then the proposal is accepted independently of
the group voting; if Eα ∧ Eγ takes place, then acceptance/rejection of the proposal is defined by
its support by the group. If Eγ is realized, then the proposal cannot be accepted. Therefore,
M(d˜G) = M(d˜G | Eα)P{Eα}+M(d˜G | Eα ∧ Eγ)P{Eα ∧ Eγ}+ 0 · P{Eγ}. (24)
If Eα is satisfied, then the proposal is always accepted. Therefore, M(d˜G |Eα)=µ by virtue of
independence of the capital increments. If Eα∧Eγ is satisfied, then acceptance of the proposal is
defined by the group voting, and generally M(d˜G |Eα∧Eγ) 6=µ.
We make use of the notation
Pθ = P{Eθ} =
ℓ∑
x=[θn]+1
b(x | ℓ) ≈ Fθ = F
(
− [θn] + 0.5− pℓ√
pqℓ
)
, (25)
to rearrange (24) in
M(d˜G) = µPα +M(d˜G | Eα ∧ Eγ)(Pγ − Pα). (26)
If the group follows Principle A, then M(d˜G | Eα ∧ Eγ) = µ+(µ, σ, g, g/2), the substitution of
(6) in
M(d˜AG ) = µPα + µ
+ (µ, σ, g, g/2) (Pγ − Pα), (27)
provides
M(d˜AG ) = µPα +
g∑
x=[g/2]+1
(
µ+
σf
q
(
x
pg
− 1
))
b(x | g)(Pγ − Pα) (28)
= µ
ℓ∑
x=[αn]+1
b(x | ℓ) +
g∑
x=[g/2]+1
(
µ+
σf
q
(
x
pg
− 1
))
b(x | g)
[αn]∑
x=[γn]+1
b(x | ℓ).
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In order to obtain the normal approximation of this value, we replace µ+(µ, σ, g, g/2) in (27) by
the approximation (10), and Pα and Pγ , by the approximations Fα and Fγ (see (25)). By using the
notation
fAG = f
([ g
2
]
+ 0.5 − pg√
pqg
)
, (29)
we obtain
M(d˜AG ) ≈ µFα +
(
µPAG +
σffAG√
pqg
)
(Fγ − Fα) (30)
= µ(PAGFγ + (1− PAG )Fα) +
σffAG√
pqg
(Fγ − Fα)
= [Fγ Fα]
(
µ
[
PAG
QAG
]
+
σffAG√
pqg
[
1
−1
])
.
If the group follows Principle B, then M(d˜G |Eα∧ Eγ)=µ+
(
µ, σ√g , 1, 0
)
, and (26) is reshaped in
M(d˜BG ) = µPα + µ
+
(
µ,
σ√
g
, 1, 0
)
(Pγ − Pα). (31)
To determine µ+
(
µ,
σ√
g
, 1, 0
)
, one may substitute the corresponding arguments in (6) or, which
is even simpler, multiply (A.4) by p:
µ+
(
µ,
σ√
g
, 1, 0
)
= µF
(
µ
√
g
σ
)
+
σ√
g
f
(
µ
√
g
σ
)
. (32)
By using the notation (20) and
fBG = f
(
µ
√
g
σ
)
, (33)
we obtain
M(d˜BG ) ≈ µPα +
(
µPBG +
σfBG√
g
)
(Pγ − Pα) (34)
= [Pγ Pα]
(
µ
[
PBG
QBG
]
+
σfBG√
g
[
1
−1
])
,
where either the exact values or normal approximations (see (25)) can be substituted for Pγ and
Pα. The expected values of the capital increments of the egoists and members of the group in a
series of s steps obey, respectively, sM(d˜E ) and sM(d˜G).
3.3. Voting Principles A′ and A′′
In addition to Principles A and B, the group can make use of Principle A′ [12] enabling it
sometimes to minimize and sometimes to eliminate the advantage of the egoists in those zones of
variation of the threshold α where they have this advantage. This is reached at the expense of
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Fig. 1. Threshold α′ vs. α.
reduced group capital increment in these zones: relative gain of the group leads to absolute losses.
We formulate below this voting principle. The threshold α′ vs. α and β is depicted in Fig. 1.
Principle A′. The group votes “for” the proposal of the environment if and only if as the result
of accepting it the part of its members getting a positive capital increment exceeds the threshold
α′ =

1
2 − δ2β , where δ = β − α, for α < β;
1
2 +
δ
2β , where δ = α− (1− β), for α > 1− β;
1
2 for α ∈ [β, 1− β]
(35)
=

α
2β for α < β;
1− 1−α2β for α > 1− β;
1
2 for α ∈ [β, 1 − β].
Since Principle A′ differs from Principle A only in the internal threshold of group voting, for
calculation of the expected capital increments it suffices to replace [g/2] by [α′g] in (19), (23), (28),
and (29). Thus, in (18), (22), and (30) one has to substitute
PA
′
G =
g∑
x=[α′g]+1
b(x | g)
or the approximation F
(
− [α
′g] + 0.5− pg√
pqg
)
≈ PA′G ,
(36)
for PG and P
A
G ,
QA
′
G = 1− PA
′
G =
[α′g]∑
x=0
b(x | g)
or the approximation F
(
[α′g] + 0.5 − pg√
pqg
)
≈ QA′G ,
(37)
for QG and Q
A
G, and
fA
′
G = f
(
[α′g] + 0.5− pg√
pqg
)
(38)
for fAG .
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Fig. 2. Capital increments of the egoists and group members following Principles A, B, and A′ vs. the decision
threshold α. Values of the parameters: β = 0.46; n = 300; µ = −0.3; σ = 10; s = 1000.
Fig. 3. Capital increments of egoists and group members following Principles A, B, and A′′ vs. the decision
threshold α. Values of the parameters: β = 0.46; n = 300; µ = −0.3; σ = 10; s = 1000.
We present some examples of applying the above formulas. For µ = −0.3, σ = 10, 2β = 0.92,
n = 300 participants, and s = 1000 steps, Fig. 2 shows the expected capital increments of the
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Fig. 4. Capital increments of the egoists and group members following Principles A, B, and A′′ vs. the decision
threshold α. Values of the parameters: β = 0.07; n = 450; µ = −0.3; σ = 10; s = 1000.
egoists and group members vs. the decision threshold, provided that the group makes use of
different voting principles.
The functions in Fig. 2 are stepwise because the results of voting are defined by the ratio of the
number of participant voting “for” and the integer part of the threshold αn. The capital increment
of a group member in the case of Principle A′ is shown by the white line which for α < 0.46 lies
slightly below the bold black line corresponding to the capital increment of a group member in the
case of Principle A. At the same time, at the passage to A′ the egoists lose more: for α < 0.46, the
thin black line that represents the variation of their mean capital passes much lower the bold white
line corresponding to Principle A. The capital of a group member grows to the limit for α ≈ 0.494
by 410 units, whereas in the case of accepting all proposals the reduction in capital is 300 units.
The expected capital increment of the egoist is positive for α > 0.52 and maximal for α ≈ 0.545.
The group can use a more radical approach to the choice of the internal threshold assuming that
it is equal to the external one.
Principle A′′. The group votes “for” a proposal of the environment if and only if as the result
of accepting it the part of its members getting a positive capital increment exceeds α.
In this case, the capital increments are calculated as in the case of Principle ′ with [αg] in place
of [α′g]. An example of using Principle A′′ is depicted in Fig. 3, all parameters being the same as
in Fig. 2.
The passage from Principle A′ to Principle A′′ in the main worsens the group activities and,
additionally, changes completely the dynamics of the egoists’ capital. In the example of Fig. 4,
practically all proposals of the unfavorable environment are accepted for α < 0.4, and practically
no proposal is accepted for α > 0.57.
For α≈0.508, the expected capital increment of a group member is maximal: M(d˜A′′G ) ≈ 54; the
capital increment of the egoist does not become positive under any α.
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Fig. 5. Capital increments of the egoists and group members following Principles A, B, and A′′ vs. the decision
threshold α. Values of the parameters: β = 0.4; n = 300; µ = 0.03; σ = 10; s = 1000.
The main distinction of Principle A′′ lies in that it leads to actual disappearance of the maxima of
capital increments of the egoists, provided that their fraction is excessive. In the case of Principles A
and B, these peaks are especially high in zones 4 and 5 namely for a small number of egoists (see
Fig. 4), and the passage to Principle A′′ eliminates them. For 300 participants, the height of these
peaks is negligible if the egoists make up less than two thirds of the participants; low peaks for 80%
of egoists (low “strongly plowed hills”) can be seen in Fig. 5.
If an optimality criterion is defined, then one may raise the question of the optimal choice of the
intragroup voting threshold. Similarly, it is possible to vary the threshold of proposal support for
principles like B. In the case of favorable environment, in particular, the requirements on the mean
one-step capital increment of a group member can be set at a higher level than in an unfavorable
environment. All examples show that to a certain extent the group can “dictate its will.” It deserves
noting that for 300 participants, neutral environment, and simple-majority procedure, the ratio of
the expected capital increment of the member of a three-participant group to the capital increment
of an egoist is approximately 1.4 in the case of Principle A and 1.75 in the case of Principle B.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Exact and approximate (based on the normal approximation of the binomial distribution) for-
mulas for the expectations of the capital increment of the “egoists” and the “group members” were
obtained for the considered model of voting in an environment with certain random parameters.
These formulas enable one to determine the form of the model trajectory for any values of the
parameters. The distinctions of different voting principles were considered using several examples.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Let (η1, . . . , ηℓ) = (ζ1I(ζ, ℓ0), . . . , ζℓI(ζ, ℓ0)). We denote n
+(ζ) by n+ for
brevity. Using the formula of total probability for expectation, we get
M(ηk) = 0 · P{n+ ≤ ℓ0}+
ℓ∑
x=[ℓ0]+1
M(ηk | n+ = x)P{n+ = x} (A.1)
for any k = 1, . . . , ℓ. Then
M(ηk | n+ = x) = M(ηk | n+ = x, ηk > 0)P{ηk > 0 | n+ = x} (A.2)
+ M(ηk | n+ = x, ηk ≤ 0)P{ηk ≤ 0 | n+ = x}.
It follows from independence of the sample elements that
M(ηk | n+ = x, ηk > 0) = M(ηk | ηk > 0) = M(ζk | ζk > 0). (A.3)
This expression is the mean normal random variable, if positive, which is determined by integration
and is as follows:
M(ζk | ζk > 0) = p−1 1√
2πσ
∞∫
0
xe−
(x−µ)2
2σ2 dx = µ+
σf
p
, (A.4)
where f = f(µ/σ). Similarly,
M(ηk | n+ = x, ηk ≤ 0) = M(ζk | ζk ≤ 0) = µ− σf
q
. (A.5)
We note that P{ηk > 0 | n+ = x} = x/ℓ and P{ηk ≤ 0 | n+ = x} = 1 − x/ℓ, substitute the
determined values in (A.2)
M(ηk | n+ = x) =
(
µ+
σf
p
)
x
ℓ
+
(
µ− σf
q
)(
1− x
ℓ
)
= µ− σf
q
+
xσf
pqℓ
(A.6)
and (A.1)
M(ηk) =
ℓ∑
x=[ℓ0]+1
(
µ− σf
q
+
xσf
pqℓ
)(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x, (A.7)
which completes the proof of Lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 2. We rearrange (6) in
M(ηk) =
ℓ∑
x=[ℓ0]+1
(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x
µ− σfq + σfpqℓ ·
ℓ∑
x=[ℓ0]+1
x
(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x
ℓ∑
x=[ℓ0]+1
(
ℓ
x
)
pxqℓ−x
 . (A.8)
The first sum in the right-hand side is P{n+ > ℓ0}; it is approximated by F (−ℓ′0). The ratio of
the two remaining sums is M(n+ | n+ > ℓ0). For ζ ∼ N(µ, σ2),
M(ζ | ζ > t) = µ+ σ
f
(
µ−t
σ
)
F
(
µ−t
σ
) (A.9)
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(this formula stems from (A.4)). We use it to approximate M(n+ | n+ > ℓ0) and obtain
M(n+ | n+ > ℓ0) ≈ pℓ+
√
pqℓ
f(ℓ′0)
F (−ℓ′0)
. (A.10)
Substitution of these approximations in (A.8) provides
M(ηk) ≈ F (−ℓ′0)
(
µ− σf
q
+
σf
pqℓ
(
pℓ+
√
pqℓ
f(ℓ′0)
F (−ℓ′0)
))
(A.11)
= µF (−ℓ′0) +
σf√
pqℓ
f(ℓ′0).

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